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Abstract  
This paper explores how to enhance the role for academic research (natural 
sciences, economics and their integration; and stakeholder management) within the 
development and implementation of water quality policy in New Zealand. Our focus 
is on the use of market based instruments and particularly nutrient trading 
programmes, which are one important part of the potential tool kit to address these 
issues. We discuss why nutrient trading might be an appropriate instrument for the 
Lake Rotorua catchment.  We survey the existing literature and then outline the 
outstanding scientific, economic and governance questions that need to be addressed 
to design an effective trading programme.  Finally we discuss how to design a 
process to address these questions drawing on both technical and practical knowledge 




Q53, Q57, Q58, A12 
 
Keywords 
water quality, emissions trading, non-point source pollution, nutrients, Rotorua, 
communication, learning 
 
   iv  v
Table of Contents 
 
1  Aims of and motivation for project..................................................1 
1.1  Why explore nutrient trading? ................................................................2 
1.2  Why do we need to better integrate academic researchers in the 
development of a nutrient trading regime?......................................................3 
1.3  Why Study Nutrient Trading in Lake Rotorua?......................................5 
1.4  Existing work relevant to nutrient trading in Lake Rotorua ...................8 
2  Specific needs for academic/technical input..................................8 
2.1  Key natural science questions: protecting water quality under 
uncertainty.......................................................................................................9 
2.1.1  How stringent should the nutrient target(s) be in the next 10 
years over the catchment as a whole?...................................................12 
2.1.2  From what type of activities and from where in the catchment 
are manageable nutrients coming now and in the future?.....................17 
2.1.3  What are short term mitigation options?................................18 
2.1.4  What are technological options for mitigation and abatement?19 
2.2  Key economic/social science questions:  Challenges for market-based-
instrument design...........................................................................................19 
2.2.1  Target setting – what level of water quality are we seeking 
and when? .............................................................................................20 
2.2.2  Monitoring and coverage.......................................................22 
2.2.3  Social, local-economic, or non-water-environmental impacts 
of programme........................................................................................24 
2.2.4 Trading  rules..........................................................................25 
2.2.5 Initial  allocation.....................................................................26 
2.2.6 Funding..................................................................................27 
2.2.7 Governance............................................................................27 
3  Next steps.........................................................................................32 
3.1  Alignment on purpose and approach ....................................................32 
3.1.1  Forming a Nutrient Trading Learning Group ........................32 
3.1.2  Learning Group participants and goals..................................33 
3.2  Learning into the future.........................................................................33 
   vi  1
1  Aims of and motivation for project 
This project has been motivated by the increasing severity and urgency of 
pressures on water and a shortfall of effective management measures. Protecting 
the quality of water, protecting groundwater stocks and ensuring efficient use of 
all water within catchments are important issues all over New Zealand for 
environmental and economic reasons.  
  One aim of this work is to enhance the role for academic research 
(natural sciences, economics and their integration; and stakeholder management) 
within the development and implementation of water quality policy in New 
Zealand. Our focus is on the use of market based instruments and particularly 
nutrient trading programmes. Market based instruments, and specifically tradable 
allowance regimes, are one important part of the potential tool kit to address these 
issues. Tradable allowance systems have been used in New Zealand (e.g. 
fisheries) and could in future also be used more widely (e.g. climate change, 
biodiversity).  
Nutrient trading is part of a suite of possible policies and needs to be 
embedded in a wider institutional framework. Some policies, such as a non-
tradable cap, could be considered precursors to a potential trading regime; they 
have many common requirements. The most difficult part of establishing a trading 
regime is defining and creating the property rights to be traded and this must also 
be addressed in any capped regime. Other policies, such as education or 
programmes to facilitate the adoption of specific technologies, would be 
complementary; both programmes will be more effective when done jointly. 
We discuss nutrient trading not because we consider it the only option, 
but because it is a potentially important part of the regulatory toolkit and because 
many of the issues that must be addressed to implement and effect nutrient trading 
must also be addressed for other effective regulations. Many of the challenges 
presented as barriers to using nutrient trading – such as setting a specific 
monitorable cap on emissions; or determining who should bear the cost of 
abatement effort – also apply to any other comprehensive regulation; they are 
simply more transparent in a trading regime.  The real trade-off is not between a 
simple, politically easy non-trading regime and a complex, politically difficult   2
trading regime where the only gains come from tradability.  The trade-off is 
between a clear explicit regulation where goals, rights and obligations are clear 
and well enforced (and with a potentially high up-front cost to gain this clarity) 
and a set of regulations where the difficult issues are still unresolved, transaction 
costs are high because of uncertainty, the environmental goal is both less clear and 
less likely to be achieved, and any gains that are achieved are likely to be 
achieved at a relatively high cost. The actual trading is in many ways secondary.  
The discussion uses the design of a trading system as a framework to 
present these wider issues. Thus, most of the technical questions addressed in 
section 2 have direct relevance beyond nutrient trading.      
1.1  Why explore nutrient trading? 
For water quality management, a well-designed and operated tradable nutrient 
regime can have the following benefits: 
1.  The total level of allowable contamination is set in a political process and 
then achieved through a cap.   
This has the advantage of certainty in the environmental outcome. It also 
ensures that consistent monitoring information will be collected and assessed 
to facilitate future management decisions.   
2.  That goal is achieved with the maximum possible flexibility. 
This includes flexibility in: where in the catchment the reductions occur; what 
land uses change; what technologies are used; what management practices 
change; and when reductions take place. This makes achievement more 
efficient and also increases the political acceptability of the programme as a 
whole because it is less prescriptive. 
3.  Private sector knowledge and innovation are mobilised to help achieve the 
goal.  
Farmers, foresters and others have a direct interest in finding and 
implementing methods to reduce nutrient run-off. 
4.  Complementary policies, such as those to facilitate the adoption of new 
technology, education or planting riparian boundaries, are more effective   3
because commercial interests are now more closely aligned with the new 
initiatives.   
Together these mean that the goal is achieved at the lowest cost in both the short 
and long term.  A tradable nutrient regime also offers political benefits:  
5.  It provides flexibility in how the costs of achieving the goal are spread.   
Either allowances can be allocated to groups who seem to face unreasonably 
high costs, or a flow of income, generated by selling or leasing allowances, 
can be used to fund policies that compensate vulnerable groups and help them 
adjust.   
6.  It allows different groups, including Maori, to be genuinely involved in 
management decisions on an ongoing basis.   
By being owners of part of the allowance pool they have a direct interest in 
each management decision as well as the resources to express that interest 
effectively.   
1.2 Why  do  we  need  to  better integrate academic 
researchers in the development of a nutrient trading 
regime? 
At a textbook level, the design of a tradable nutrient regime is simple:  
set a cap on emissions; allocate allowances; allow trade; and monitor emissions.  
In reality, each of these steps is complex and difficult to do well.  A poorly 
designed system that ignores the complexity will not achieve the benefits listed 
above and may even make the problem worse both environmentally and 
economically. The complexity arises from both the natural science underlying it 
and the economics.  While the academic researchers cannot offer perfect solutions 
to any of the issues, the expert understanding of researchers needs to be combined 
with the pragmatic expertise and local knowledge of stakeholders to make good, 
genuinely joint decisions under uncertainty.  
National consultation on the Water Programme of Action (New 
Zealand. Ministry for the Environment, 2004), and interviews with stakeholders 
undertaken for this report, highlight a highly variable understanding of how 
market based instruments could work, of options around their practical 
implementation, and of other factors that need to be managed concurrently to   4
allow an effective market to operate. The issue of market based instruments has a 
political dimension, in part due to concern that the adoption of market based 
instruments would represent a path to the private ownership of water, and the risk 
of ‘winner takes all’ markets.  On the other hand, some stakeholders who are 
proponents of trading believe that ‘using markets’ is an alternative to regulation 
rather than a specific form of regulation albeit one with more flexibility.   
The potential contribution of market based instruments needs to be 
explored inside a ‘learning environment’ where the technical dimensions can be 
fully analysed, and also where the potential readjustments in relationships among 
agents and with the resource can be explored without participants representing any 
group or negotiating on their behalf. In this report, we focus on the technical 
information needed as an input to that process (key questions), and the principles 
that will inform the design at several levels, and we propose some specific process 
design elements of the learning environment.   
To implement an effective nutrient trading programme we would need 
to create a receptive environment in the set-up phase (i.e. before the market is 
operational) so the policy is politically attractive and all key stakeholders engage 
constructively to improve the market design.   
During the early stages of developing a nutrient trading approach, and 
particularly before relative allowance allocations are clearly established, 
significant resources are at stake and large distributional issues must be resolved 
within the private sector and between private agents and various levels of 
government. One key concern is to ensure that conflicts over the allocation of 
costs do not lead to poor decisions on the fundamental architecture of the system.     
Positive stakeholder collaboration is also useful after the water 
management system is created. Because public preferences and scientific 
knowledge will continue to evolve, adaptive management will be necessary. 
Adaptive management is much more likely to succeed if stakeholders not only 
conform to the formal rules but participate constructively in the further 
development and adaptation of the management system. The incentives for 
collaboration in this stage are somewhat different from in the initial stage as 
property rights will have been established (at least in terms of relative cost   5
sharing) and the conflicts of interests between private sector stakeholders and 
between economic and environmental interests may not be so stark.
1   
Researchers and analysts involved in the establishment of market-based 
incentives in other areas (e.g. fisheries quotas in New Zealand, sulphur dioxide 
emissions trading in the U.S.) feel that part of stakeholder resistance to policies 
comes from lack of understanding of key technical issues, whether they relate to 
the seriousness of the problem or the real effects of a trading programme. An 
effective collaborative process should facilitate communication of this scientific 
and economic information and allow any political negotiations to focus on issues 
where real conflicts of interest occur.  Effective communication can also help to 
avoid what researchers see as mistakes in policy where technical information is 
not used or misused and policy decisions are made that have real costs without the 
real compensating gains that the political stakeholders believe are being achieved. 
1.3  Why Study Nutrient Trading in Lake Rotorua? 
 
The Rotorua lakes region presents a case study area in which to develop 
generalisable results that can inform similar processes in other regions in the 
future.  It is one of the first in a large number of catchments nationally that face 
similar issues (Environment Waikato has already created a form of trading 
programme for Lake Taupo). A lot of work is already going on relating to water 
quality in the Rotorua region and potentially a nutrient trading system could be set 
up in the Lake Rotorua catchment.   
                                                 
1 Though restrictions on land and water use will impose costs on some stakeholders, many of the 
same stakeholders also have an interest in the protection of water quality, because of its positive 
effects on local land values.   Both the absolute and the relative costs of regulation will be 
important to these stakeholders. They may be willing to bear higher costs when those costs are 
partially offset by land values, and when they know that others will bear their share also.  Those 
who own ‘allowances’ (rights to apply nutrients) might also support (or not oppose) more stringent 
targets because more stringent targets will raise the value of the allowances that remain.  Thus they 
may oppose the regulation during the set up of the system, but become supporters or at least less 
active opponents once it is operational.  This effect has been seen in the case of the New Zealand 
Fisheries Individual Tradable Quota system where the contest over allocation of initial quota was 
ferocious and drawn out (nearly 20 years until all challenges were resolved), but over time fishers 
have come to support the system and reduce their resistance to more stringent quota limits. This 
support has reduced the enforcement challenge for many stocks because fishermen monitor each 
other.  There are some crucial exceptions to this positive outcome which are also instructional (e.g. 
arguably orange roughy where private interests are not aligned with sustainability and stocks have 
been allowed to collapse). This effect arises because fishers are the primary beneficiaries of stock 
protection. This positive effect is likely to be weaker in the case of water quality because 
landowners within the catchment receive only a small percentage of the total gains from improved 
water quality.   6
Nutrient trading systems are a potentially valuable tool in the Lake 
Rotorua catchment partly because there is a large number of players and many 
potential abatement options, many of which are still in development and for which 
the relative values are both uncertain and highly variable across players. This 
complexity means that private players have large amounts of ‘private information’ 
about their best abatement strategies (i.e. information not available to the 
regulator).  An efficient water quality policy needs to use this information and 
conventional non-market forms of regulation will not easily elicit it.   
The physical characteristics of the lake and, in particular, its naturally 
high productivity resulting from a large catchment area (including a large area of 
agricultural land) relative to lake volume also suggest that a land use management 
strategy that focuses on managing nutrient loads would be appropriate and that 
innovative management is required. This strategy could possibly be 
complemented by other interventions. 
Although monitoring nutrient application and understanding its ultimate 
effects on water quality are complex and require the use of models based on 
simple observable data, once these models are accepted (and they are needed for 
any regulation based on players’ effectiveness at improving water quality, i.e. 
‘performance based’ rather than direct input controls) no extra data are required 
for trading.  Thus, the administrative burden on government and private players 
needs not be high. 
The major barrier to most trading systems is the need to explicitly 
define and allocate property rights, in this case to nutrient applications.  All 
regulations implicitly define these rights, but under many regulations they may be 
perceived as less permanent or their non-transparency may allow them to be 
ignored.  In the case of water quality in Lake Rotorua, many of the issues relating 
to property rights definition are already resolved through the existing RMA 
process though some important ones are outstanding.   
Finally, creating property rights and a trading mechanism is a costly 
process (in both political and economic terms).  It is worthwhile where the gains 
from efficient water quality management are likely to be high.  Lake Rotorua is 
likely to meet this criterion. Water quality issues are already causing serious   7
environmental and economic cost and continuing development in the catchment is 
unlikely to lead to water quality improvements on its own but rather the reverse.  
Thus the level of effort to enhance and protect water quality is likely to rise and 
the value from making that effort efficient will also rise.  A trading market can 
facilitate an efficient mitigation effort both because mitigation efforts are done in 
the most effective way at each point in time and because the market creates 
incentives to find and adopt new technologies and land management methods.   
Lake Rotorua is probably the only part of the Rotorua Lakes region 
where trading would work well at least in the short term.  In the longer term, if the 
problem becomes more acute requiring more intensive action, if the trading 
programme is working well, and if transfers of water/nutrients between lakes 
become a more serious issue, the trading programme could be extended. 
Nutrient trading programmes would be a complement and a supplement 
to ongoing Rotorua lakes efforts.  They cannot be developed in isolation, so it is 
critical to involve key stakeholders who are already involved and affected by 
water quality management efforts. Ongoing efforts to develop and apply 
technology or to develop cooperation to change land management practices 
through other programmes may facilitate the operation of a nutrient trading 
programme. 
In the other direction, a trading programme can help to verify that the 
system as a whole is working because it, by design, must cover and monitor all 
nutrient flows.  It can thus coordinate different efforts and help evaluate them.  As 
an example, one stakeholder raised that in the Lake Taupo case, the government 
paid for riparian boundaries along all streams leading into Taupo when the 
problem of excess nutrients was first identified.  This lowered nutrient inputs 
effectively in the short term, but couldn’t fully solve the long-term problem and, 
because it was a one-off effort, it did not generate ongoing monitoring and 
evaluation of progress.  A trading programme would require this periodic 
monitoring and evaluation as an integral part of its operation.  
A trading programme also provides incentives and, potentially, capital 
to facilitate the adoption of technology and practices that are piloted in other 
programmes thus making their broader application much easier.     8
1.4  Existing work relevant to nutrient trading in Lake 
Rotorua   
Environment Bay of Plenty and many others have been working on the 
quality of the lakes in the Rotorua region for many years.  They have a well 
advanced technical and consultation process for water quality management in 
general.  The many reports they have commissioned are available online at 
www.envbop.govt.nz/Water/Lakes/Technical-Reports.asp.  These have been 
carried out by the University of Waikato, NIWA and a range of other statutory 
bodies, research agencies, consultants and non-governmental groups and are 
critical to understanding the physical/biological, institutional, social and economic 
context that is relevant to nutrient trading.   
The April 2006 report of the Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner 
for the Environment “Restoring the Rotorua Lakes” provides an excellent 
synoptic review of the issues of water quality in the Rotorua Lakes, including 
nutrient sources and the “lag time” issue.  It also provides an overview of action 
already underway to improve water quality, including reference to the Rotorua 
Lakes Protection and Restoration Programme, RMA statutory plans, the role of 
the Ministry for the Environment, Treaty Settlement, community initiatives and 
research. 
The Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry has funded a series of 
projects that explore different abatement options within the Rotorua Lakes region.  
The lake and catchment environment of Lake Taupo is one of the most technically 
studied regions of New Zealand, and some of this material is directly relevant to 
Lake Rotorua.   
Some of this literature is referenced in the text below.  It, and the 
insights of the analysts, stakeholders and researchers involved in creating it, will 
all form the starting point for exploring the specific technical challenges 
associated with a nutrient trading programme.  
2  Specific needs for academic/technical 
input 
Below, we outline the key natural, economic and social science issues 
relating to creating an effective nutrient trading system and specifically for   9
creating one for Lake Rotorua.  Most of these questions are also salient for other 
regulatory options. These are issues that should be addressed jointly and 
collaboratively by stakeholders.  They all have a purely technical element, but 
also need to involve local knowledge and political judgement to create a 
technically and politically effective and sustainable management system.  
The technical aim of the engagement would be to ensure that 
stakeholders understand the nexus of economic, policy and natural science issues 
as much as possible and, where they cannot understand them, trust the technical 
experts/process well enough to separate technical from political issues and narrow 
the range of issues on which negotiation is needed.   
The technical issues can never be resolved with complete certainty. 
Lack of information should not necessarily mean lack of action however. What is 
needed is an informed judgement that we know enough that we can take actions 
now that are better than the status quo.  We can then seek more information both 
from fundamental research and by evaluating the effects of our actions and use 
this information to improve our decisions over time.  This is the essence of 
adaptive management. 
When we discuss some of these issues with stakeholders we will benefit 
from existing detailed local technical research.  In other cases, we can draw on 
experience from similar issues elsewhere in New Zealand (e.g. catchments with 
similar hydrology, trading rules and governance processes design in the NZ 
Fisheries Individual Transferable Quota system) or abroad (e.g. Australian water 
management including water trading, similar environmental markets). In still 
other cases, we will either require some dedicated research or will need to handle 
them as inherent uncertainties. 
2.1  Key natural science questions: protecting water 
quality under uncertainty   
 
Two regulatory decisions are heavily dependent on natural science 
input. 
1.  How stringent should the nutrient target(s) be in the next 10 years over the 
catchment as a whole?     10
Figure 1 outlines the different steps in relating ultimate environmental goals to 
caps on monitorable, manageable applications of specific nutrients (net of 
mitigation actions) at specific points in time and vice versa.  Each of these arrows 
and boxes involves a body of science knowledge and some uncertainty.  We need 
to use as much knowledge as possible about how reductions in applications of 
each nutrient will contribute to our ultimate goal when we decide how intensively 
to target each manageable nutrient and when.  The effects of reductions in nitrate 
applications on algal blooms will depend on how much of this nitrate reaches the 
lake and when, the likely levels of phosphate and uncontrollable nitrates in the 
lake, and how the two nutrients interact.   
This question is not at all specific to nutrient trading but must be resolved 
clearly (even if in an interim way) before allowances can be defined (allowances 
to do what, when?), and the allowance cap can be set.   
Figure 1 Linking environmental goals to nutrient caps 
 
Ultimate Goal 
For each point in time: 
•  Probability of algal bloom 
•  Level of visibility 
 
Nutrient levels in lake  
For each point in time: 
•  Nitrates 
•  Phosphate 
Monitorable applications on land 
 
Monitorable mitigation measures  
Existing lake bed phosphates 
Manageable nutrient flows 
with lags 
Non-manageable nutrient flows 
including lagged flows from pre 
regulatory period 
Phosphates released 
Cap on applications net 
of mitigation for each 





2.  How should we create rules that allow land-use/management change (e.g. 
intensifying dairy) in one place to be offset by other land-use/management 
changes (e.g. using EcoN or allowing native reversion) in another place or 
at another time? 
The environmental goal could be achieved in a number of ways.  When deciding 
how to weight different management efforts in a non-trading system or how to set 
trading rules - how changes in one activity can be offset by changes in another - 
the science needs to be used to establish which changes in application/mitigation 
patterns across space and time will lead to more or less equal environmental 
outcomes.     11
Figure 2    Science required to establish scientifically robust tradeoffs / trading rules: nitrates  
 
 
Nutrient levels in lake  
For each point in time: 
•  Nitrates 
a units of N applied in area A 
b units of N applied in area B 
No mitigation action  
Cap on applications net 
of mitigation with 
clearly defined trading 
and banking rules 
Hold this fixed 
x units of N applied in area A 
y units of N applied in area B 
Mitigation action z in area B 
or 
or
c units of N applied in area A this year 
d units of N applied in area A next year  
b units of N applied in area B 
No mitigation action  
Manageable nutrient 
flows with lags 
 
 
Again this involves intensive science input: measurement of the net nitrate and 
phosphate flows from each activity, as well as a spatial and temporal 
understanding of catchment-wide surface and groundwater dynamics.   
 
This section aims to begin to explore two questions in relation to these critical 
regulatory decisions:    
A.  What existing scientific/technical knowledge do we need to 
effectively communicate to stakeholders involved in designing a 
nutrient trading programme?   
•  This is potentially a trade-off between ‘What do we know enough 
about to communicate effectively and clearly’ and ‘What is really 
key scientific information without which they may make terrible 
mistakes’.  The latter may be complex and uncertain and hence 
difficult to communicate easily. 
 
B.  What new scientific research should stakeholders consider 
commissioning as part of a ‘joint fact finding’ process to help them 
make better decisions? 
  The answer to this probably takes into account where there is most 
uncertainty; where the uncertainty is most important for policy; and where we 
might actually be able to reduce uncertainty. 
This section does not try to provide answers to the critical questions.  It 
provides some basic background but primarily aims to outline the natural science 
issues that the learning and policy development process will need to consider.    12
Many groups are already addressing the scientific issues in the Lake Rotorua 
context.  In particular Environment Bay of Plenty, the Rotorua District Council 
and Te Arawa Maori Trust Board have created a Technical Advisory Group 
(TAG) to assess technical aspects of lakes research.  We will focus on the 
application of existing science to our issues, as well as identifying any necessary 
extensions or new interpretations of existing research that arise specifically as a 
result of a trading programme. The scientists involved in our process are also 
involved in the Technical Advisory Group. As we design and develop the learning 
process, the scientists and other participants will decide which questions to focus 
on and where to seek new research. 
What would be technically ideal, would be a dynamic spatial stochastic 
model of the catchment and lake that includes data on all historical nutrients in 
groundwater and links these and current land use and management to various 
measures of the probability of certain water quality states and adverse events. This 
would allow us to simulate baseline water quality as well as water quality under a 
number of different mitigation scenarios. This science-based model could then be 
linked to economic models of the costs of low water quality and spatial, dynamic, 
stochastic models of the costs of changing land use and management in specific 
places and at specific times, or implementing direct mitigation strategies.  This 
would inform a process that would allow us to set targets efficiently and design an 
optimal trading programme.  In the absence of such a model we need to explore 
each dimension of the issue and use judgement where research is weak and 
modelling does not allow us to link components.  
2.1.1  How stringent should the nutrient target(s) be in the next 10 
years over the catchment as a whole?   
2.1.1.a  What are the consequences of lake water nutrient levels? 
This is a central question when choosing the ultimate environmental goal.  The 
key problems for the public are nuisance algal blooms and reductions in water 
clarity, while there are also concerns that the trout fishery might ultimately be 
impacted by severe eutrophication.  No unique water quality indicator adequately 
predicts all of these changes.  In addition, the science can tell us something about 
indicators of physical damage but these are only one aspect of determining the   13
loss of value to humans.  This is a key contribution to the problem of deciding an 
appropriate ultimate environmental goal. 
Water quality status of the Rotorua lakes may be examined from a number of 
different perspectives; through water clarity measurements or trophic level 
indices, which combine information on nutrients, phytoplankton 
concentrations and water clarity, and, for deeper lakes, depletion rates of 
dissolved oxygen in bottom waters in association with stratification.  In 
addition, LakeSpy may be used as an indicator of health of benthic plant 
communities, specifically macrophytes.  Together, these indices provide an 
indication of trends in water quality; (Hamilton, 2006) 
... there were substantial decreases in both water clarity and invasive 
macrophyte beds [in Lake Rotorua] through the 1970s.  (Hamilton, 2006) 
Several indices have been used in this paper to denote long-term trends in 
water quality in the major Rotorua lakes.  Across all of the water quality 
indices selected, only Lake Rotoma and, arguably, lakes Rotomahana and 
Rotorua appear to be stable.  (Hamilton, 2006) 
Damage is not likely to respond linearly to nutrient levels either in a 
physical sense or in terms of how humans perceive the damage. 
It is important to use these measurements to forecast when there may be 
abrupt and sometimes catastrophic changes in lake water quality and 
biodiversity as a result of increased stresses imposed by additional 
nutrients and invasive species. (Hamilton, 2006)  
 
Key outstanding questions are: 
•  What is the current status of water quality in the Rotorua lakes and how 
great is the difference between this state and a relatively unimpacted state? 
•  How accurately can we forecast the extent of change of water quality in 
Lake Rotorua? 
•  How can we link nutrient levels to water quality measures and the 
probability of extreme events such as algal blooms? 
 
2.1.1.b  Are any damages persistent or even irreversible (i.e. do they depend on 
past as well as current nutrient levels)? 
This is important because it determines whether the ultimate goal can 
be defined as a long term nutrient level only (with many possible paths to that 
goal) or if we need to be concerned about the path, and particularly with peaks in 
the path, even if they are short lived. The simple answer is that the path matters. 
The costs of restoration amplify greatly once lake degradation exceeds a ‘tipping point’, 
when the lake switches into a low-water clarity state often characterised by loss of weed 
beds in shallow lakes or increased blue-green algae (cyanobacteria) populations in deep 
lakes. (Hamilton, 2006) 
 
In addition there may be a strong hysteresis in the recovery path once the tipping point 
has been exceeded (Harris, 1999). (Hamilton, 2006)   14
 
There may have to be quite severe management actions taken in the degraded lakes in 
order to achieve restoration.  These actions may involve attempting to limit nutrient 
exports from the land, but may also include inflow diversions, flocculating and 
sedimenting out nutrients from the water column, dredging sediments or attempting to re-
aerate bottom waters.  Preliminary analyses indicate that the costs of these measures may 
be 1 to 2 orders of magnitude greater, in terms of mass of nutrients removed per dollar 
expended, than the costs of land-based applications of the nutrients in the form of 
fertiliser.  This analysis serves to demonstrate the importance of retaining nutrients on 
the land and targeting lake restoration measures to arrest degradation before the tipping 
point characterised by rapid degradation. (Hamilton, 2006) 
 
The critical questions are: 
•  How close is Lake Rotorua to the tipping point?  David Hamilton and 
Paul Dell consider that Rotorua has already had a tipping point.   
•  What levels of reductions in manageable nutrient flows would it take 
to avoid reaching the tipping point given the lags in groundwater flows 
on the one hand and the potential to control lake bed sediment releases 
on the other? 
2.1.1.c  What nutrients should a trading programme aim to control? 
There is no point controlling one nutrient if increased levels of the other 
combined with baseline levels will still lead to acute water quality problems.  If 
controlling one of the nutrients would be hard and small changes in its flows 
would have little effect in the short term, however, it may not be such a priority 
for control.   
Either phosphorus (P) or nitrogen (N) may be the limiting nutrient for 
phytoplankton growth in Lake Rotorua, depending on location and time.   
Currently N is considered to be limiting most of the time.  Not only are absolute 
levels of these nutrients important, but also the ratio between them, which can be 
used to infer which nutrient is limiting phytoplankton growth.  In addition, low 
ratios of nitrogen to phosphorus have been associated with increased incidence of 
nitrogen-fixing blue-green algae (cyanobacteria), many species of which form 
blooms at high concentrations.  Blooms of blue-green algae can have adverse 
impacts on lake amenity, including formation of surface scums, toxin production 
and effects on fisheries. 
In order to assess which nutrient to control, we need to understand: 
•  Are there different optimal strategies for control of N versus P in the 
catchment?   15
•  What are the implications of targeting management of a single nutrient 
(either nitrogen or phosphorus) and making that nutrient the primary 
control on phytoplankton growth? 
o  What would happen if we only controlled N in the short term? 
o  Can we effectively control P outside the trading programme? 
•  To what extent will nutrient controls on land be confounded by lake bed 
releases of nutrients from an abundant historical store? 
2.1.1.d  How much of each nutrient is flowing into Lake Rotorua and how do they 
reach the lake? 
This helps us understand the levels of baseline or uncontrollable 
nutrients in the lake in the future; the environmental effects of changes in 
manageable nutrients will depend heavily on this.  It also helps us to understand 
the timing with which nutrients applied in the future will affect the lake.  In 
particular it helps us understand the likely effect of having tight targets in the 
short run but more flexibility in the long term in contrast to a slow starting 
programme with tighter future targets.   
Nitrogen 
 
Most nitrogen enters the lake through groundwater either directly 
(about 15-20%) or indirectly through nine major streams.   
The nitrogen loading to Lake Rotorua prior to major landuse development in the 
catchment in the 1950’s was calculated to be 60 t/year. This has slowly increased to a present 
nitrogen load of 420 t/y, delayed by long travel times of the groundwater. The nitrogen 
loading is expected to further increase to 532 t/y in 50 years (25% increase from current), 572 
t/y in 100 years (35% increase from current), and to 619 t/y at steady-state (47% increase 
from current).  (Morgenstern et al.)  
This forecast assumes a specific path of land use and management. 
About 75% of the groundwater-derived nitrogen loading at steady-state enters Lake Rotorua 
via the nine major streams, and about 20% enters the Lake from direct groundwater inflow 
via the lake bed. The loading estimate for the direct groundwater has the largest relative 
uncertainty because very limited age and chemistry data are available. Lake side springs and 
minor streams together contribute only about 5% of the total nitrogen load to Lake Rotorua. 
(Morgenstern et al.) 
Groundwater that feeds streams and springs in the Lake Rotorua catchment has mean 
residence times of water in the aquifer of 15 to 130 years. These long residence times result in   16
considerable lags of nitrogen loading to the lake from historical agricultural and urban 
development in the catchment. Currently observed increases in nitrogen loading in surface 
and groundwater are mostly due to the delayed impact of catchment development that 
occurred around 55 years ago. Further increases in nitrogen are expected as detailed above. 
(Morgenstern et al.) 
This means that efforts to reduce the amount of nitrogen that enters groundwater 
and hence the lake will take effect very slowly and that the problem is likely to 
worsen before it improves.  The groundwater estimates are still quite uncertain.  
The following question is still the subject of active research: 
•  What are the groundwater residence times and how do they vary 
across the catchment? 
We also need to know 
•  What are the historical applications of manageable nitrates that are 
still flowing through? 
2.1.1.e Phosphorus 
In contrast, P appears to be stable. 
In marked contrast to nitrate, there is no evidence of a trend in baseflow soluble phosphorus 
concentrations in the major streams of the Rotorua catchment.  Stream phosphorus loads 
currently comply with the target load for streams.  Sewage phosphorus loads were high 
during the 1980s but currently comply with the assigned target load. (Environment Bay of 
Plenty. Technical Advisory Group, 2004) 
No changes are expected in phosphorus loads via groundwater as long as landuse-derived P 
continues to be absorbed by the volcanic soils in the catchment. (Morgenstern et al) 
Controlling P is not subject to the lags related to groundwater.  
•  How does P get into the lake now? 
2.1.1.f  Once nutrients reach the lake, how long do they stay there? 
Again, this helps us to understand the baseline levels of nutrients and 
also how the effects of manageable nutrients will play out over time.   
 The mean residence time for water in the lake is only about 1.5 years.  
This doesn’t mean however that if nutrient flows were immediately altered to pre-
development levels, nutrient levels in the lake would return to pre-development 
levels in 1.5 years. The key factor influencing the rate of recovery is nutrient 
release from sediment in the lake bed. Deoxygenation caused in part by 
eutrophication releases more nutrients from sediment creating a negative feedback 
with increasing supply from the catchment.    17
The duration of intermittent stratification events, when water stops mixing 
vertically, is sufficiently long in Lake Rotorua to effect occasional periods of 
deoxygenation of bottom waters (Rutherford et al., 1996).  Furthermore, these 
deoxygenation events contribute significant inputs of ammonium and 
phosphate to the water column, that in years of prolonged stratification (i.e. 
weeks) may produce internal nutrient loads comparable to those arising as 
point and diffuse sources from the lake catchment (Burger et al., this volume). 
(Hamilton, 2003) 
Thus any trading programme to reduce land use and land management 
sources of N and P could possibly be complemented by efforts to manage and 
control lake bed sediments. These efforts will be contingent upon the following 
knowledge: 
•  How effectively can lake bed sediment nutrients be controlled in 
the large area of Lake Rotorua?   
•  What is the likely effect of efforts to control lake bed sediments 
relative to efforts to control nutrient inflows?  Are there different 
levels of risk in the two strategies? 
2.1.2  From what type of activities and from where in the catchment 
are manageable nutrients coming now and in the future? 
What activities important to include; what basis cap is determined on; 
what sort of trading might be valuable; what might happen to prices of nutrients in 
future? 
...nutrients arising from agriculture have contributed most to human-induced nutrient 
loads to lakes in New Zealand (Ministry for the Environment, 1997), though contributions 
from septic tanks and stormwater are significant.  Removal of the natural vegetation 
cover and destruction of the mechanisms that conserve nutrients in natural ecosystems, 
together with fertiliser applications, can greatly increase export of nutrients associated 
with agricultural development (Moss, 1998).  The relationships between agricultural 
development in catchments and eutrophication of lakes have been demonstrated locally 
(McColl, 1972; Malthus and Mitchell, 1988) and globally (Foy and Withers, 1995).   
(Hamilton, 2004) 
Not only have nutrient flows increased, particularly from agriculture, 
but also mechanisms that conserve nutrients in natural ecosystems have decreased. 
AgResearch has some good information on nutrient leaching from different types 
of land uses (www.envbop.govt.nz/water/media/pdf/land use.pdf). They also 
discuss the issues of spatial variation in nutrient leaching.  A presentation put 
together by NIWA scientist Kit Rutherford (Rutherford, 2004) also discusses the 
processes associated with nutrient loss from catchments.  Because groundwater   18
flows vary spatially, nutrients applied in different parts of the catchment will have 
different effects on the time path of damage. 
Sewage was a major contributor in Lake Rotorua but this problem was 
dealt with in 1991 when sewage was diverted. It could potentially be a problem 
when sewage is applied to land if P is not adequately absorbed or nitrates are 
leached. Natural nitrogen flows are very low relative to human induced flows so it 
appears that most baseline flows could potentially be controlled. 
The critical questions are:  
•  Should we include activities other than land use in a trading 
programme? 
•  Should we include protection and restoration of natural 
mechanisms to conserve nutrients as well as applications of 
nutrients in the trading programme? 
•  How do we vary the way we treat monitorable nutrient applications 
(or nutrient leaching if we model that directly) across the 
catchment to address spatial variation in leaching and time taken to 
flow to the lake.  
•  What percentage of P in stream inflows is controllable, particularly 
given the dominance of stormflows in contributing P loads to 
lakes? 
2.1.3  What are short term mitigation options?  
If short term mitigation options can be used to lower nutrient levels 
immediately and avoid the peak flows from historical emissions we can focus our 
land use regulation on longer term solutions. If we can use short term measures to 
avoid reaching a tipping point, we can encourage ‘banking’ or increased short 
term reductions but not require stringent short term targets for land based flows.  
The potential for short term solutions such as chemical treatment, 
diversion of flows, and changes in management of surface water is discussed in a 
Ministry for the Environment commissioned report (Hamilton, 2003). Several of 
the potential options outlined in this report have been discussed by the TAG group 
and discarded (e.g. use of herbicides for algal bloom control).  Chemical control 
in a lake the size of Lake Rotorua is probably risky and would require 
comprehensive planning and preparatory studies prior to application. 
•  Should we consider any short term mitigation options in Lake 
Rotorua?  
•  What impact could they have on nutrient levels and water quality?    19
2.1.4  What are technological options for mitigation and abatement? 
One of the major benefits of a nutrient trading regime rather than a non-
tradable regime is that we do not need specific information on how reductions are 
to be achieved.  When monitoring of the behaviour that leads to reductions is 
costly, however, information on key options that landowners are likely to choose 
is useful. Landowners can be rewarded with allowances only for actions that are 
included in the monitoring system. Thus if we believe that many dairy farmers 
could choose to install feeding pads we will want to require reporting of the 
existence (or non-existence) of a feeding pad. In contrast, if only one landowner is 
likely to enhance a wetland as a mitigation measure it is probably not worth 
designing a wetland mitigation measurement system just for this one use. The 
availability of options also gives some idea of the cost of meeting any target level 
of nutrient applications and so is a key input to the decision on how stringently to 
set the target.   
Many options are available and some are under active research and 
evaluation through processes such as the Sustainable Farming Fund.  Some of 
these options are summarised in Menneer et al (2004).   
2.2  Key economic/social science questions:  Challenges 
for market-based-instrument design  
In economic terms, the first task for any stakeholder collaboration to 
develop a nutrient trading market is to ensure that all participants understand the 
basic structure and functioning of a trading programme.  This should be presented 
in a simplified text book form with a clear understanding that the real life 
complexities will be discussed later. This stage would allow agreement on 
common terminology for the later more complex discussions.   
Here we outline the key design questions that need to be tailored to any 
specific case. Some of these issues have already been explored for Lake Rotorua 
by Nimmo Bell in reports commissioned by EBOP (Bell and Butcher, 2003, Bell 
et al, 2004 and Bell and Yap, 2004).  Preliminary answers to some are embedded 
in existing regulations such as Rule 11.  Other questions were explored in the 
similar case of Lake Taupo in Bennett et al (2006).  Many are intrinsic to design 
of any good regulation – not just a trading programme – so have been extensively 
considered by existing stakeholders.  For other questions we can draw on research   20
from other catchments or even abroad. The ‘answers’ to these will draw on the 
key science questions addressed above. Here we focus on the implications for 
regulatory design. As the discussions progress, participants will identify new 
issues, and reprioritise and redefine the existing ones. We group the questions in 7 
categories: 
1.  Defining and setting the manageable nutrient targets 
2.  Monitoring of activities and coverage of sources/sinks 
3. Social,  local-economic,  or  non-water-environmental impacts of 
programme 
4.  Defining trading rules 
5.  Initial allocation of allowances 
6. Funding 
7. Governance 
2.2.1  Target setting – what level of water quality are we seeking 
and when? 
2.2.1.a  Definition of target 
The damages we are concerned about come from the quality of water in 
the lake.  In contrast, the costs of regulation depend on exactly what is regulated. 
Because the impact of behaviour on water quality cannot be directly observed, we 
need to find proxies and monitor these (discussed further below). The target 
should be defined in terms of water quality in particular places and times first.  
The link between that and monitored activity, e.g. manageable nitrate 
applications, needs to be explicitly modelled even if those models involve 
significant uncertainty.  The first critical decisions then are whether to target only 
nitrogen or also phosphorus and then, which model of the link between 
monitorable land use and management and water quality to initially use:  these are 
primarily natural science questions as discussed above.    
2.2.1.b  Level of target 
In a technically ideal world, the target setting process would be 
informed (but not determined) by a detailed dynamic cost-benefit analysis that 
would take into account levels of damage from poor water quality along different 
‘paths’ (nutrient levels over time) and the costs of controlling nutrients to the level 
below business-as-usual of those different paths. The analysis would find the   21
optimal path using a societal discount rate and would take uncertainty into 
account explicitly including society’s risk aversion.   
In reality we do not have the information to do this.  Even if we had an 
enormous research budget, we could not accurately assess society’s preferences 
over different pollution paths or the costs of achieving those paths let alone assess 
‘societal’ risk preferences. Instead, we must use research budgets carefully to 
understand the scale and key dimensions of tradeoffs and then use expert and local 
knowledge to reach an informed negotiated judgement.   
To assess the cost of damage we need to consider the following socio-
economic/cultural questions together with the scientific questions discussed 
above: 
•  What types of damage do people care most about?  E.g. visibility, 
smell, hazardous algal blooms that prevent water sports, potability of 
water, protection of native habitat.  
•  What is the scale of the economic cost of environmental damage dollars 
and how sensitive is it to the pollution level? 
•  How do people trade-off current damage with future damage? 
•   To what extent does culture influence views of the need for action? 
•  What outcomes are people most fearful of?  Are there critical thresholds 
in damage? 
•  How does this translate to economic costs through loss of tourism or 
trade advantages from our ‘clean green’ image? 
To assess the cost of controlling pollution to given levels, we need to address the 
following questions: 
•  What would happen to land use and hence nutrient application if there 
were no regulation?  
•  What are the current costs of controlling nitrogen application?  E.g. 
how valuable is marginal fertiliser use?  How much does it cost to 
change the timing of fertiliser use if that could help?     22
•  How much would short term mitigation measures (such as adding 
chemicals to the lake) cost? 
•  How much will it cost to reduce nutrients quickly rather than slowly?  
E.g. How many fixed capital assets will be affected by a move to lower 
nitrogen use? – e.g. age and value of milking sheds on marginal dairy 
land; how many new technologies are currently in development? 
•  How sensitive is the cost of control to the level of control at a point in 
time and over time?  Are there thresholds where control suddenly gets 
much more expensive?  
The problem of definition and level of target must be resolved before 
the programme can begin. It must also however be updated regularly to reflect 
changes in preferences and new information. This requires the establishment of a 
governance process that can oversee research and make these decisions in an 
acceptable way. The design of this governance process is part of the initial 
programme design and is discussed below.  
2.2.2 Monitoring  and  coverage 
2.2.2.a Monitoring 
There are two motivations for monitoring. The first is to ensure 
compliance with the regulation and achievement of the defined cap.  The second 
is to evaluate the effectiveness of the regulation in reducing inputs of nutrients to 
the lake and ultimately water quality. Here we focus only on the first type of 
monitoring. The second will be a critical input to the governance process and 
ongoing reassessment of the cap. 
An effective, efficient monitoring system is required for any cap on 
nutrients – not only for trading. It is a critical element of an effective trading 
system. The ideal monitoring system would include contributions of every human 
behaviour (primarily land use and land management practices) to the path of 
nutrients, and hence ultimately damage probabilities, in critical locations – i.e. 
parts of the lake where damage is most likely. 
In reality this is impossible, so we need to use a model that relates 
behaviours that we can observe and verify to contributions to damage.  This is an 
issue on which the collaboration between natural and economic sciences is critical   23
to find an appropriate trade-off between the value of more accurate information 
and the cost of collecting that information.  Critical questions involving economic 
information include: 
•  How much of the flow of nutrients in the catchment is affected by a 
particular type of potentially monitorable behaviour? For example if the 
potential behaviour is protection of existing wetlands, how much 
wetland area is there and what effect does it have on lake quality? 
•  How sensitive to the incentives from the trading programme is 
behaviour on activities relating to each potentially observable 
characteristic?  These include positive incentives to abate an activity if 
the characteristics it affects are included in the monitoring, and 
perverse incentives to increase this activity instead of another 
monitored one if the characteristics this activity affects are excluded. 
Using the wetlands example again: ‘Are the existing wetlands under 
threat and could this threat be significantly reduced under the 
regulation?’ ‘If the nutrient implications of clearing forested areas to 
increase dairy land are included in the programme while wetlands are 
unregulated so they can be drained, is there a real risk that farmers will 
drain wetlands rather than clearing forest in response to the policy?  
2.2.2.b Coverage 
All sources of nutrients, controlled and uncontrolled, need to be 
included in some way for evaluation and updating the total target (in an analogous 
way, to set commercial fish catch limits optimally, recreational fishing of those 
stocks must be estimated).  The key issue is which sources/actors the programme 
should require to monitor and take responsibility for nutrient applications directly.  
If a set of sources is excluded from the system in the way that recreational fishers 
are excluded from the fisheries ITQ system, the other actors share the 
responsibility for covering any increase in their nutrient applications so that the 
cap as a whole is not breached. An alternative strategy would be to have the 
regional or local council directly responsible for applications by uncovered 
sources. In deciding which sources to cover, the trade-off is between those 
sources’ abilities to respond to the regulatory incentives (positively to inclusion or   24
negatively to exclusion) and the cost of inclusion (these abilities and costs may 
relate to size or activity type). Thus the key questions here are: 
•  Which sources should be monitored directly and made responsible for 
applications? 
•  Who should bear responsibility for applications by uncovered sources? 
As with the target, the rules for monitoring and the level of coverage 
can and should be reassessed over time through a governance process that should 
be defined in the initial set-up.   
2.2.3  Social, local-economic, or non-water-environmental impacts 
of programme 
Ideally a trading programme will have one ultimate goal (water 
quality).
2  If stakeholders want to address more than one goal through one 
programme, they need to clearly understand the tradeoffs.  Stakeholders are often 
concerned that a trading programme will have unintended social impacts (e.g. the 
closure of small farms) or impacts on other environmental issues (e.g. on 
biodiversity).   
In some situations side effects are a real problem.  For example, a 
programme that rewards carbon sequestration in plantation forests, but does not 
take account of biodiversity can lead to significant losses of biodiversity for 
relatively small carbon gains. 
This can be a problem even without trading.  For example a farmer may 
reduce nutrient loads to meet her cap by converting half her farm to plantation 
forest and thus also reducing local employment. With trading because the 
possibility for land use and management change is much greater (which is the 
source of the benefits) the side effects can also be greater.  Stakeholders must 
remember that the side effects of a trading programme may also be positive, so 
restrictions may not only damage the water quality programme but also may lead 
to the loss of other side benefits of behavioural change aimed at water quality 
improvement, such as biodiversity protection.  Local economic gains in one area 
                                                 
2 There will be important instrumental goals relating to how that is achieved.  For example, a good 
programme will achieve the goal at the lowest economic cost and with the best cultural impact 
possible – i.e. maximising opportunities for sustainable land use – and will involve the greatest 
possible local collaboration in management and decision-making.   25
from trading restrictions will be more than offset by economic losses elsewhere.  
Rather than limiting transferability of allowances, stakeholders should consider 
achieving these other goals through the existing RMA mechanisms. The 
application of the RMA might need to be adjusted with a trading programme 
because new issues are likely to arise, or existing issues may become more 
important.  Thus key questions are: 
•  Is the extra goal a legitimate aim for policy – would it be supported 
by the electorate if stated directly? 
•  Can the goal be adequately managed through the RMA or other 
existing instruments? 
•  Is restricting or altering the trading programme an effective way to 
achieve the extra stated goal? 
•  What is the cost in terms of the primary goal of achieving the 
secondary goal? 
2.2.4 Trading  rules 
2.2.4.a  What can be traded? 
This is defined entirely by monitoring rules and allowance holdings, 
and any RMA-related restrictions on land use and management change as 
discussed above.  If a landowner changes his behaviour and the monitoring rules 
mean that his new behaviour is related to lower measured manageable nutrient 
applications he will have excess allowances and will be able to sell them.   
2.2.4.b  Administration of trading 
Any cap system, with or without trading must record individual 
landowners’ allowable cap and monitored/modelled levels of nutrient 
applications. This system can deal with ownership of allowances at each point in 
time as well as any banking of allowances for future use. A trading programme is 
even more dependent on the integrity of this system because mistakes can lead to 
illegitimate trades.  Also, as much information should be made easily available 
from the system to facilitate buyers and sellers’ search for trading partners.  This 
registry system is very similar to a simple bank or stock registry and could be 
modelled on the fisheries ITQ system.  Various software packages are available 
for this function.  Stakeholders need to be comfortable with the operation of the   26
system to reassure themselves about the simplicity of trading as well as the 
environmental integrity of this aspect of the system.  They could work through 
this using simulated games on existing software and with simple proposed 
versions for registry and trading templates.  The key questions here are: 
•  What exact form of registry and trading software should be 
implemented? 
•  What information in the registry system should be made publicly 
available (and to whom)? 
An issue that needs to be resolved nationally is the ability of Regional 
Councils to create a simple trading programme under the RMA.  Currently, 
allowances must be linked to land and transfers must happen through RMA 
processes which makes them more complex and uncertain than necessary and may 
significantly reduce the effectiveness of the market.  The key question here is:   
•  What legal form should trading take under the RMA? 
 
2.2.5 Initial  allocation 
This is the most politically contentious issue. It involves allocation between 
government and private actors, as well as allocation between private actors. We 
discuss it after many other issues because debates about initial allocation should 
be informed as much as possible by understanding and agreement on the shape of 
the programme as a whole. What we would be seeking here at a technical level 
would be common understanding of some underlying processes and principles 
rather than agreement on relative allocations. The key questions for discussion 
are:  
•  What are the effects of allocation – wealth, efficiency, psychology? 
•  Who will bear costs of water quality improvement?   
•  Who benefits from water quality improvement? 
•  Who has historically contributed to damage? 
This issue has been extensively discussed in the Rotorua Lakes area and 
some principles have already been established.  The discussion could build on   27
those understandings and existing data and analysis and see if additional research 
can help move the debate forward. 
2.2.6 Funding   
A trading system needs funding for three distinct tasks.  The first arises 
during initial implementation.  Setting up a regulatory system, including trading, 
is a costly process in itself.  Often to resolve the initial allocation issue and get 
sufficient stakeholder buy-in to the programme, it is useful to have some funding 
available to buy back some nutrient applications so that the initial target can be 
met with relatively little cost to individuals.  This approach was used relatively 
successfully in the fisheries ITQ situation where some stocks were over fished and 
the total allowable catch set was lower than existing catch.  Voluntary buy backs 
avoided either cutting everyone’s catch or requiring decisions about who would be 
excluded from the fishery.  This was funded by central government.  Similarly, for 
the Lake Taupo case, a fund has been established to ease the initial introduction of 
the nutrient cap.   
Funding is also required to support recurrent administration costs and 
the cost of research to support the evaluation and hence evolution of the system.  
To decide how these should be funded, stakeholders need to consider who benefits 
from the operation of the existing system and who benefits from system 
improvements – they are not necessarily the same groups.  These are the obvious 
candidates to fund these activities.  The amount and sources of funding will be 
likely to have material effects on how decisions about the future evolution of the 
system are made.  
2.2.7 Governance 
No regulation is perfect when first created. This is particularly true of 
environmental regulations that need to deal with changing social and 
environmental circumstances and new knowledge about human-environment 
interactions.  Therefore, environmental governance structures should allow the 
evolution of the regulatory system to occur in an effective, fair and efficient way.  
Without this, the system will not adapt to change, and will be vulnerable to 
collapse in a crisis.  This approach has been called adaptive management, and is   28
widely used for management of complex natural-human systems in 
environmentally sensitive areas.  
When the nutrient trading system is first created, the initial rules will be 
set, as discussed above.  In addition, a ‘constitution’, which provides a framework 
for review and updating of the rules, needs to be created.  The ‘constitution’ needs 
to define who participates in making decisions, how decisions are made, how the 
system is monitored and evaluated, which aspects of the system can change 
without a ‘law’ change (a rule or the equivalent for a Regional Council), what 
structure is placed on the changes.   
2.2.7.a Monitoring  and  Research 
A process for monitoring various aspects of the system, including water 
quality, nutrient flows and regulatory functioning, and for commissioning and 
reviewing research to provide a sound technical basis for programme review 
needs to be established. 
The key questions here are: 
•  How can nutrient producers and other interested parties best 
engage with the regulatory authority and each other to monitor 
the implementation of the system and ensure that it is meeting 
agreed goals? 
•  What technical information and expertise will be most relevant 
to governance (and who will decide what research to 
commission and from whom?) 
•  How can technical information and expertise best be integrated 
in the governance process? 
To ensure responsiveness to changing local environmental conditions 
(positive or negative),  the governance structure and process needs to incorporate 
technical knowledge and expertise in a way that is credible – and is seen to be 
credible by expert, government and citizen stakeholders. The governance system 
must communicate and incorporate the scientific information in an effective and 
trusted way to avoid manipulation of science or simple misunderstanding.   
Stakeholders must feel that although the science is uncertain, the current state of 
knowledge is being presented and applied in an unbiased way.   29
2.2.7.b  Which aspects of the system can change without a ‘law’ change (or the 
equivalent for a Regional Council), and what limits are placed on how 
they change? 
Stakeholders’ interests are not necessarily consistent over time.  While 
it may be better for the group as a whole to agree in advance not to change certain 
aspects of the rules over time, it may be in individual stakeholders’ interests to 
later challenge that.  For example, all stakeholders are better off ex ante agreeing 
on relative allowance allocations once and for all when the programme is 
established.  However, some will turn out to have more bargaining power in later 
periods and would then like to renegotiate the allocations.  Renegotiation is costly, 
encourages the redirection of effort toward political ends rather than 
improvements in water quality, and anticipation of renegotiation creates 
uncertainty, so it is better to avoid it if possible.   
Thus the institutions of the nutrient trading system would ideally restrict 
future changes.  The ‘constitution’ could define the principles by which potential 
changes will be assessed, and restrict the forms of change by clearly defining the 
parameters that need to be reassessed.  For example, allowances could be defined 
as shares of the total nutrient target so that as that target is reassessed, individual 
allowance holdings are automatically changed.   
The question of what should be able to be updated and how, can be 
asked for each of the aspects of the system discussed above in 2.2.  One 
particularly complex case is that of updating the model used to define allowable 
changes in management practices and trades.   
Updating monitoring model 
The monitoring model will need to be updated repeatedly to allow new 
mitigation options and incorporate new information on existing options. 
Landowners should be protected from risks arising from scientific uncertainty that 
they do not understand.  At the same time however, they should be encouraged to 
use their private information on new mitigation options that are likely to be 
included in the near future, and should be prevented from exploiting information 
about shortcomings in the model that will soon be addressed.  For example, even 
if EcoN is not initially included in the monitoring model because of technical 
constraints, landowners should not be discouraged from using it. Conversely, if 
the model over-rewards conversions from dairy to forestry, and this is commonly   30
known and hence a change in the model is anticipated, such conversions should 
not be encouraged. 
When deciding how to respond to these issues, the following questions 
arise:   
•  Who should bear the risk of changes in the monitoring model?  The 
way each landowner’s allowance need is adjusted and the target is 
changed in response to monitoring model changes, determines who 
bears the risk in the monitoring system. 
•  How is the need for allowances adjusted for each landowner as the 
monitoring model is updated? 
•  Do landowners’ pre-existing land practices affect the measured 
emissions that they need to match with allowances when those land 
practices are added to the monitoring model, or do the measurement 
changes apply only to changes in land practices going forward? Are 
relative allowances for different management strategies that have 
already been implemented affected by changes in scientific 
information that lead to a realisation that the nutrient impacts of 
current strategies have been over- or under-estimated?   
•  When a new, highly uncertain management option is added to the 
model, should transfers of allowances be limited to temporary transfers 
to avoid exploitation of errors that landowners know will later be 
corrected? 
2.2.7.c  Process for making decisions over time 
To ensure continuing public support for environmental management, it 
needs to represent--and be seen to represent—the interests of key stakeholders in a 
fair way.  The decision making process will be partly determined by existing 
institutional structures including the Resource Management Act framework, but a 
lot of flexibility remains.  Decisions on the process will need to consider questions 
such as the timing of reviews, who is involved in reviews in what roles, how 
agendas are set, what resources are available to participants. Stakeholders must 
perceive that they have voice and influence in decision making, and that the   31
decision making process is fair. Otherwise, it is unlikely that they will support its 
decisions.     32
3 Next  steps 
 
3.1  Alignment on purpose and approach 
Key technical questions relevant to implementing a market based 
approach have been explored above. This section outlines ways that Rotorua 
Lakes stakeholders might jointly explore the use of market based instruments for 
nutrient management in the Rotorua Lakes.  
3.1.1  Forming a Nutrient Trading Learning Group 
Motu, with support from Environment Bay of Plenty, the Ministry for 
the Environment and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry have convened a 
small focused group of experienced stakeholders and technical experts to develop 
a proposed structure for a nutrient trading programme that will address water 
quality issues in Lake Rotorua.  After each meeting, material will be made 
available to stimulate discussion and feedback so that preliminary results can be 
fed into the wider water quality policy development process.  The final output will 
be a concrete nutrient trading design proposal and set of backing documents by 30 
April 2008.  In the longer term, we hope this proposal will form a template for 
trading programmes in other catchments.   
The work will build on the extensive scientific and regulatory design 
work already done in the catchment and take account of existing regulatory 
structures.  The group will develop working documents on each key design issue, 
meet bi-monthly to discuss these drafts and then revise them for more general 
release.  The process is not intended to reach political agreement but to: clearly 
outline the issues at stake; present the current state of knowledge; and propose 
technical solutions to the challenges that arise where they are possible.   
The group was established in February 2007.  It will meet bi-monthly 
for 16 months.  This group is aligned with a proposal being submitted to the 
Foundation for Research Science and Technology to do more technical research 
on these issues but is not dependent on that new research.  The first 16 months 
will be based primarily on existing knowledge but will also identify research 
needs.  That research could be incorporated in a second phase.    33
3.1.2  Learning Group participants and goals 
The learning group’s membership encompasses the main stakeholder groups with 
an interest in nutrient management. It also includes technical experts jointly 
acceptable to the stakeholders, who support the group’s work by assessing and 
developing nutrient trading options. The group’s goal is to learn about nutrient 
trading and assess whether and how trading could be useful for Rotorua Lakes 
land management and environmental protection. 
As a whole, the group includes members spanning the following categories:  
•  Technical specialities   
o  Economic skills (deep understanding of market based instruments)  
o  Scientific skills 
•  Agency perspectives 
o  Local government 
o  Central government   
•  Rural land uses 
o  Farming (dairy and non-dairy)  
o  Forestry  
o  Lifestyle 
•  Civil and cultural 
o  Maori 
o  Rural  
o  Environmental 
3.2  Learning into the future 
The PCE report on the Rotorua Lakes uses the phrase, “The Ultimate 
Endurance Challenge’. A fundamental value of taking the learning process 
seriously at this stage is the capacity it builds in the local and regional community 
(and in the national community) for dealing with a complex issue in a deeply 
informed way, while also learning to think about it in a way that includes the 
community.  The future is uncertain, but a capacity to listen deeply to one another 
is at the heart of a sustainable future.   34
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Annex:  Design of a Learning Process  
The composition of a learning group 
There were two options for a technical learning group.  One was for it 
to focus on scientific, economic and policy technical skills.  These people would 
have a similar way of relating to technical material.  The other option was to 
include people in the learning process who represent perspectives of all the 
elements who will be involved in the future implementation of a nutrient trading 
regime, if adopted.  There were sound reasons to consider the latter, other than on 
the grounds of “representation of the interests of the stakeholders”. The latter is 
not the intention of a learning process – and the issue of representation, in its own 
right, should be managed external to the technical learning process.   
The reason for including a range of perspectives in the technical 
working group is two-fold. First, people think differently. Technical people use an 
empirical approach.  People from business use a commercial perspective, and 
others see the world through a cultural lens. These different views will challenge 
each other and lead to deeper exploration of the issues.  Second, at the next stage 
of the process, when the technical group engages other regional stakeholders, 
people communicate most clearly with others who use a similar language and 
rationality.  Because eventually, the intention is to “ripple out” the learning, the 
technical group should be designed with this capacity in mind.  
Key differences in perspectives between respondents 
Technical knowledge of the lakes and catchment, management options 
and challenges, and many of the issues of water management identified in the 
national consultation round and interviews are equally well understood by some 
respondents at the national, the regional and the local levels. In other words, the 
knowledge (and wisdom!) is not limited to either a national or a local level.  There 
is a broadly shared commitment to the lakes and their management, and to social, 
economic, cultural and environmental well-being, at all levels.  Furthermore,   
some distinct perspectives and inspiring examples of leadership can be found in 
individuals. It is also possible to detect frustration, stubbornness,  resignation and 
deep fear in individuals across all levels.  We also detected misunderstanding 
between individuals.    39
On reflection, the most distinctive consistent difference between 
respondents have been categorised into four primary perspectives, below (based 
on cultural theory, Thompson, 1988).  The perspectives have a sound basis in 
theory, and have arisen framed in relatively similar ways in reviews of other water 
programmes globally.  The distinctions are proposed as working hypotheses.  
It is useful to consider that everyone takes all of these perspectives as 
part of their total world view.  Respondents are not regarded as exclusively 
belonging to one or other perspective.  However, for the purpose here, and 
specifically for the purpose of the design of an agency, technical and community 
engagement and learning process, this distinction is useful: 
1) Agency  perspective. 
 When operating from an agency perspective, people focus on the authority, 
accountability, policy instruments, planning processes and formal organisation 
and legislation. Their focus in on decisions.  For example, EBOP staff spoke 
in detail about the Regional Council’s approach to planning and managing the 
catchments and water bodies, and the structure of working and technical 
groups.  
2) Technical  perspective. 
When operating from a technical perspective, people focus on formal 
scientific  (or economic) evidence, models, and frameworks. Their approach is 
based on empiricism, (observations of what is deemed real) viewed through 
disciplinary frameworks of reference. They will seek for truth.  For example, 
scientists (both university and agency-based) spoke in depth about the 
scientific evidence and the models of water bodies. 
3) Cultural/Sector  perspective. 
When operating from a cultural or sectoral perspective, people focus on the 
accepted consensus within their primary cultural or sectoral identity group.  
This could be within a local Maori network, or within a network of farmers, 
local tourist operators, beach owners or staff of the regional council. This 
perspective uses primarily the rationality of hermeneutics - how persuasive a 
view point is, rather than whether it is the truth in scientific terms).    40
4) Individual  perspective. 
Everyone has an individual perspective, but some individuals are more easily 
seen through this frame than through an agency, technical or cultural frame.  
Individual farmers, land owners, or other businesses may come into this 
category.  Their views on the world are based largely on the world view they 
hold as an individual, and the process by which they distinguish what is 
appropriate might be called truthfulness.  The frame of reference will be true 
to myself as distinct from a statutory, technical or group point of reference.  
For example, other farmers and agricultural consultants in the catchment 
spoke from their own perspectives about water quality issues in the lakes 
catchment.   
Purpose and process of a learning group 
  The learning group is not a policy development or a design group.  Its 
intention is to ‘get its (collective) head’ around some complex technical issues and 
follow these logically through, exploring them from different technical 
perspectives, then from the “four perspectives” described earlier (organisational, 
technical, cultural and individual), and then to contribute back to a wider group 
from the emergent systems view.   
  The focus of the learning group is both to learn for itself and also to 
learn ‘for the system’.  The group becomes a resource for the rest of the 
community, as a group of people who can speak about the ‘business of nutrient 
trading’ from every key perspective that is held in the catchment – and in 
language that makes sense to each of those perspectives.  So, it is not a technical 
sub-committee of a policy organisation, neither is it a group that represents a 
range of positions and interests.  
  The process for learning in this way is being used globally in a small 
number of leading programmes focussed on whole-system transformation, 
including the Global Sustainable Food Lab facilitated by the Sustainability 
Institute in collaboration with MIT.   
  The learning group will be trained and coached in the fundamentals and 
disciplines of team learning, which should include training in systems thinking, 
mental models and learning in a multi-perspective setting.   41
Four Stages of a learning process 
Early in the process, the group will sort out the key issues that it needs 
to start exploring, and then collaborate within itself and with external people to 
gather facts, build models, and explore their application.  The process would be 
one of ‘discovery based planning’. 
The first stage of a learning process is to suspend judgement while 
exploring the useful perspectives of each of the participants.  This would include a 
primer on the catchment technical perspectives (science, economics).  In this 
stage, the group focuses on listening to each of the participants fully – to identify 
all the issues which they see from their perspective.  This helps to reveal both the 
theoretical perspectives that the participants employ, and their cultural 
perspectives, concerns and values – many of which are so familiar to us they are 
in our “blind spot”.   
  The second stage is to “dive deep” into the system from one perspective 
at a time, for example, lakes ecology, or the economics and practicality of 
farming, or the theory and practice of developing nutrient trading mechanisms.  
These could involve  
•  Technical presentations and joint application of technical ideas 
to specific questions 
•  Visits from people with an external perspective (e.g. who have 
worked on the fisheries ITQ system) 
•  “Learning journeys” to visit places or people in the catchment to 
learn to see the world through their eyes.  Learning journeys are 
not field trips, but ways of bringing close focus on specific 
aspects of the system.  In global experience, it is through this 
process that some of the most unexpected insights, and later, 
innovations, in complex settings emerge. 
Reflecting on each, the group gets to see what the perspective provides, 
and what it misses out.   
The third stage, after creating scenarios, is to explore the impact of 
these scenarios on different groups in the catchment. And lastly, the process   42
explores the way the scenarios would affect individuals, or how individuals would 
need to change in order to operate well in that scenario.   
The learning group itself, in this last stage, would reflect on what it has 
learned and working together, will create “teaching tools” to share what they have 
learned with the ‘folks back home’ – people who see the world they do.  As a 
communications discipline, participants would draft communiqués for one 
another’s audience, to see if they could explain what they see, ‘cross culturally’. 
The learning group would go through this learning cycle as many times 
as is practical and as it takes to surface a ‘systems view’.   
   43
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